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ALBERTO SZEKELY*

Transboundary Resources:
A View From MexicoSCOPE OF THIS STUDY

The abundant literature on the subject of transboundary resources between Mexico and the United States has focused largely on the more
evident and visible of them, those which have been most essential for
sustaining the pressing human needs along the border, namely, water
resources. Recently, the literature has increasingly concentrated on one
of the most promising sources of that resource: underground aquifers.
Also, as population growth and industrialization have rapidly progressed,
the effect of human activities on the environment, especially on river
waters and the atmosphere, has yielded a significant number of published
environmental studies. This has been the framework within which the
subject of transboundary resources has been approached, in general, by
writers and specialists from both sides of the border. It is thus easy to
conclude that the approach has been in many ways limited, since the
subject lends itself to much more. This is so simply as a result of the
fact that deposits of natural resources transected by the political border
between the two countries are much more varied than the ones indicated.
Therefore, a need exists for a more global and comprehensive approach
to the subject in general, which is the central purpose of this study.
In this writer's view, such a holistic scope is more than a mere academic
convenience. There is an appreciably urgent need to initiate an analysis
of the sort of general policy that might be expected from Mexico regarding
the whole array of issues pertaining to the utilization and conservation
of the vast natural wealth at its northern border, precisely because of the
increasing demand that is to be expected for it resulting from the ever
expanding social needs in the area. Thus, much more sooner than later,
Mexico will need to prepare a policy which anticipates the fact that its
implementation will inevitably involve not only negotiation, but also
cooperation with its neighbor to the North. Therefore, such a policy will
have to become an integral part of the country's foreign policy which,
as always when it involves the United States, will unavoidably be at the
highest priority level of the nation's political agenda.
*LL.B., University of Mexico; M.A. and M.A.L.D., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy;
Ph.D., University College London, Faculty of Laws.
tThis article will appear in the forthcoming book New Views Across the Border, Stanley R. Ross,
editor, to be published by the Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State University.
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Considering the large dimension of the existing literature, which concentrates on international river water uses and environmental problems
in the border region between Mexico and the United States, it would be
highly repetitive to expound in this limited space on those concrete aspects
of the larger phenomenon of transboundary resources. Thus, this article
will focus primarily on those other aspects which have not received the
treatment they require. The history of the bilateral border relations between the two countries has translated into an impressive amount of joint
action to deal with their common rivers, having even reached a high
degree of sophisticated institutionalization, as represented by the work
and results of the International Boundary and Water Commission. Much
progress has also been achieved in the ecological field, as exemplified
by the Agreement for Cooperation on Environmental Programs and Transboundary Problems, signed by Presidents Miguel de la Madrid and Ronald
Reagan on August 13, 1984 in La Paz, Baja California.' This example
of bilateral willingness to cooperate was preceded by difficult and sorrowful chapters of environmental controversies, including: the problem
of the contamination of the Mexicali Valley as a result of salinity in the
waters coming from the Upper Colorado River,' and which was dealt
with, albeit not resolved through, Minute 242 of the International Boundary and Water Commission of August 30, 1973;' the concern raised by
the blowout of the oil well Ixtoc-I in 1979, which led to the Agreement
of Cooperation Regarding Pollution of the Marine Environment by Discharge of Hydrocarbons and other Hazardous Substances, signed in Mexico City on July 24, 1980;' and the still pending problems deriving from
the pollution of the Tijuana and other rivers. Again, not analyzing here
the different facets of the much studied problems that have arisen and
which remain regarding water resources and environmental phenomena
should not be taken at all as an underestimation of their enormous importance. Such importance has been recognized already not only in the
literature, but also in the different academic efforts that have been organized to deal with transboundary resources between Mexico and the
United States.
One of the most serious and intensive of such efforts was undertaken
by a study group of specialists from both countries, as well as from
1. Agreement for Cooperation on Environmental Programs and Transboundary Problems, Aug.
14, 1983, United States-Mexico (not yet published); see 1. KAVA & A. SPRUDZS, A GUIDE TO UNITED
STATES TREATIES IN FORCE 348 (1985); Diario Oficial, Mar. 22, 1984.
2. See generally InternationalSymposium on the Salinity of the Colorado River, 15 NAT. RES.
J. 1 (1975), and L. CABRERA, LA

SALINIDAD

DEL

RIO

COLORADO:

UNA DIFERENCIA INTERNACIONAL

(1975).
3. Minute 242, Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of
the Colorado River, Aug. 30, 1973, United States-Mexico, 24 U.S.T. 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 7708.
4. Agreement on Pollution of the Marine Environment, July 24, 1980, United States-Mexico,
T.I.A.S. No. 10021; Diario Oficial, May 18, 1981 and Aug. 5, 1981.
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Canada and the United Nations, which met in 1976 in La Jolla, California,
and in 1979 in Oaxtepec, Morelos. The group's purpose was to further
the research in the field to fill a gap which participants felt the countries'
official agencies had been reluctant to fill. This study group became an
important and pioneering forum concerned with the problems and opportunities for the management of transboundary resources. The results
of the meetings were published in a specialized periodical which has been
at the forefront of the academic effort regarding this topic, the Natural
Resources Journal of the University of New Mexico School of Law, under
the editorship of Professor Albert E. Utton, himself a leading authority
on the subject of transboundary resources.' The most important aspect
of the study group's approach was that it dealt with transboundary resources still on a fragmented or individual basis, without making an effort
to produce a political, legal, or philosophical general apology for the
need for the two countries to undertake coherent and coordinated action
to deal with their transboundary resources. Again, because of the overwhelming potential of one of those resources, water, either surface or
underground, the symposium understandably gave preferential attention
to it. However, the individual papers submitted at that forum did provide
the basis for initiating a more global and comprehensive study of the
subject as a whole.
Another ambitious effort to deal with the subject was the Meeting of
Mexico-United States Universities on Border Studies in La Paz, Baja
California in 1980, sponsored by the Mexican Asociacion Nacional de
Universidades e Institutos de Ensenanza Superior, 6 which made an effort
to depart from the above mentioned concentration on traditional aspects
of the problems and to expand, however succinctly, into at least the listing
of other nonconventional transboundary resources.
This article will attempt to provide a more comprehensive approach to
the subject, without dwelling any further on the significant amount of
work that has already been produced on specific aspects of it. Instead, it
will take that work as a starting point.
TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES AND BILATERAL RELATIONS
Despite the incalculable importance of transboundary resources in the
border area between Mexico and the United States, as well as the vast
complexity of the matter, one may safely assert that the issue has not yet
become central in the political agenda of the bilateral relations between
the two countries. Rather, as pointed out above, joint or individual action
5. See generally Symposium on U.S.-Mexican Transboundary Resources (pts. I & 2), 17 NAT.
RES. J. 543 (1977), 18 NAT. RES. J. 1 (1978).
6. See generally ESTUDIos FORENTERIZOS (ANNUIES: Mexico, 1981).
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has been taken, in a non-integrated fashion, tackling specific problems
for utilization and conservation of isolated resources as they have arisen.
There is no doubt that there is a definite lack of a planned bilateral policy
to rise to the challenge that all such resources present to the two countries.
Ambassador Jorge Castaneda stressed the elements of strong interdependence between the two countries in a paper he submitted during
the symposium "Mexico Today" in November 1978, just a few months
before he was appointed Foreign Minister of Mexico.' He emphasized
U.S.-Mexican economic cooperation, and singled out the role which
"shared resources," especially groundwater and aquifers on both sides
of the border, can play in such cooperation. However, his perception as
to the importance of such resources in bilateral relations did not quite
translate into a major foreign policy initiative toward the United States
to start dealing jointly and seriously with the problem. Instead, the Foreign
Minister was excessively occupied during his tenure with the political
and commercial questions involved in the export of oil and gas from
southern Mexico to the United States. Still, the mere mention of this
matter in a paper which was regarded at the time as one of the best
analyses of Mexican policy toward the United States signified that there
was at least an awareness, at the highest official level, of the importance
of transboundary resources in the bilateral relations between the two
countries. This awareness, however, still has to materialize into a well
defined policy.
On the other hand, Professor Mario Ojeda has stated that the increasing
incorporation of the Mexican border zone into the economy of the United
States has become an element of pressure in Mexico's bargaining position
in negotiations with the United States. He suggests that as the two countries engage in a joint venture to exploit transboundary natural resources
on the Mexican side, the amalgamation of the Mexican border in the
neighboring economy may be taken to risky levels, as a process of "denaturalization" could be thus in the making. 8 While there is a need for
a planned policy, perils exist as well.
But the need is undeniable. In attempting to satisfy it, policy makers
should carefully take into account the fact that the great social, economic,
cultural, political, and legal diversity between Mexico and the United
States will inevitably have, as it has had often in the past, an enormous
impact on the way the two countries will together approach the question
of how to better utilize and conserve their transboundary resources. They
7. See generally Castafieda, En Busca de una Posicirn ante Estados Unidos, I LA GACETA DE
TLATELOLCO 5 (1979).
8. M. OJEDA, ALCANCES Y LiMiTS DE LA POLTICA EXTERIOR DE M9XICO 152 (1976).
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should not forget that, of more than 120 developing countries in the
world, Mexico is among the few which share a border with one of the
largest and most industrialized States, which puts it in a risky and, to
say the least, special position in the effort, to deal with its neighbor on
an equal basis. Thus, what is really in the making, as far as can be
realistically foreseen, is a "protective," or defensive policy.
Such an orientation will be further stimulated by historical experience,
which has given definite shape to the general conception in Mexico regarding border matters. It is an already traditional conception, which may
not be quite ready to adapt to new circumstances and needs, such as those
pertaining to transboundary resource utilization. The traditional conception of border affairs is still heavily influenced by the centuries-long
problem of border delimitation, which was settled only recently, in comparative terms, through the Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado River as the International
Boundary Between Mexico and the United States. 9 The treaty was only
possible after the two States resolved the nightmarish controversy of the
Chamisal, which hurt bilateral relations for several decades. Still, other
border delimitation problems have emerged-at sea-as will be seen later.
As Professor Cesar Sepulveda has indicated, the history of defining
and establishing a permanent border with the United States is one of
prolonged conflict. " The loss of territory to the United States in the mid19th century, and the Chamisal problem, require the passage of some
time before the nationalistic feeling that they evoked will wane, so as to
give room for a more open environment for negotiators on newly identified
"border problems," such as the need to start setting the basis for rational
utilization of transboundary resources.
Nonetheless, historical experiences, no matter how lasting their bitter
effects, cannot overshadow the reality of the need to satisfy, with the
available natural resources in the area, increasing social needs. Edwin
Carpenter and Larry Blackwood have undertaken a significant study on
the effect that potential population growth on the border will have on the
required exploitation of natural resources." On the other hand, Professor
Francisco Alba has given attention to the pressure that economic and
industrial growth at the border will have on available natural resources
in the region. 2 The water requirements to keep up with industrial growth
9. Boundary Treaty, Nov. 23, 1970, United States-Mexico, 23 U.S.T. 371, T.I.A.S. No. 7313;
Diario Oficial. July 12, 1972.
10. See generally C. SEPOLVEDA. LA FRONTERA NORTE DE Mtxico (1976).

il.See generally Carpenter & Blackwood, The Potentialfor Population Growth in the United
States Counties that Border Mexico: El Paso to San Diego, 17 NAT. RES. J. 545 (1977).
12. See generally Alba, Condicionesy PollticasEcondmicas en la FronteraNorte de Mexico, 17
NAT. RES. J. 571 (1977).
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in the region have also been the object of early studies.' 3 Thus, consciousness of the need for planning is already there, including awareness
as to the effect that the exploitation of one resource will have on the
sustained availability of another. For instance, researchers estimate that
exploitation of the impressive reserves of energy resources in the Upper
Colorado River basin, especially coal reserves, uranium, and oil shale,
will require vast quantities of water, as most of the energy production
technologies currently in use or available are large water-consuming processes. Such water will have to come from the reserves of that resource
in the region, which includes the border area. 14
What is needed, then, for the two countries to come together and plan
ahead, for their mutual benefit, for the utilization and conservation of
their transboundary wealth? Is it safe to rely on the foresight of policy
makers at both sides of the border? Is it inevitable that they will only
respond in the face of specific natural or demographic crises? The answers
to these questions are certainly quite hard to foresee. But before anyone
attempts to address them, it is undoubtedly necessary to have a comprehensive and global understanding as to the meaning of the problems
transboundary resources pose and the dimensions of their potential-an
understanding in which legal concepts have a definite role to play.
TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES: LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
One of the most authoritative experts on the subject of natural resources
across international borders, Julio A. Barberis, after defining the term
"resources" as meaning those elements which humans use to satisfy their
needs, and specifying that they will be "natural" when they come into
existence without human intervention, ventures that they are to be regarded as "shared" when they are neither those belonging to a single
State nor those which belong to the international community; instead they
are those that find themselves under the jurisdiction of two or more States,
with the exclusion of everyone else.'
In this author's view, such a definition, which unfortunately is widely
accepted, is faulty and incomplete. For many-even if they inevitably
accept the natural unity of a given deposit of resources-the sovereignty
of a given State over its territory and the natural wealth it contains cannot
13. See, e.g., Ayer & Hoyt, Industrial Growth in the U.S. Border Communities and Associated
Water and Air Problems: An Economic Perspective, 17 NAT. RES. J. 585 (1977), and Zwerneman,
Economic Development in the El Paso-Juarez Area and Its Impact on Water Supply, 17 NAT. RES.
J. 619 (1977).
14. See generally Brown, Sawyer & Khoshakhlagh, Some Remarks on Energy Related Water
Issues in the Upper Colorado River Basin, 17 NAT. RES. J. 635 (1977).
15. See generally J. BARBERIS, Los RECURSOS NATURALES COMPARTIDOS ENTRE ESTADOS Y EL
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL (1979).
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be fragmented, much less shared. That part of a transboundary resource,
whether solid or fluid, on its own side of the border belongs to and is
the property of that State. Mexico is highly likely to maintain such a
view, as will be seen later. It is a totally different consideration, and
makes much more economic and ecological sense, for a country with
such resources to cooperate with its neighbor, through jointly planned
action, to utilize and conserve them. Such cooperation does not put into
question the property of a country over the resources inside its borders.
Thus, even when they may be regarded as "shared" from a purely geographic point of view, legally they definitely are not. Consequently, the
concept of sharing, related as it is to the notion of property, is inadequate.
If such resources are to be qualified on the basis of their location, a more
appropriate term to be used is, precisely, "transboundary" resources.
Such a concept would in fact be a great deal more attractive to a country
with Mexico's legal traditions.
Barberis' definition is incomplete because he does not take into consideration all possibilities of transboundary resources. There are not only
boundaries between sovereign States, but also between the jurisdiction
of a State and either a zone which legally is open to the community of
States as a whole, such as the high seas; or between the jurisdiction of
a State or the high seas and a zone which is reserved for mankind as part
of its common heritage, that is, the international seabed area (which is
the "Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof Beyond the
Limits of National Jurisdiction.") 6 In the above sense, the stocks of
living marine species, the marine waters which may be put to an economic
use such as the production of energy from them, and the minerals and
hydrocarbons in the soil and subsoil of the sea, are necessarily transboundary resources if they are located in or move around areas transected
by a boundary between an exclusive economic zone and high seas, or
between a continental shelf and the international seabed area.
Consequently, if all such resources are to be taken into account, a
definition as to their "transboundary" nature cannot be limited to those
in a boundary between two States.'As will be seen later, a comprehensive
definition is essential in order to attempt a complete inventory of transboundary resources of interest to Mexico and the United States. Taking
all of the above into consideration, the following definition of "transboundary resources" may be proposed: They are those natural resources
located in an area through which a land or territorial, fluvial, lacustrine
or maritime border runs, separating two sovereign States or a State and
16. Draft Final Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 21,
1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/121 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1245 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Law of the Sea Convention].
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a marine zone which is beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, namely,
either the high seas or the international seabed area. Those volumes or
portions of such resources located within the territorial or maritime sovereignty of the State are, in general, legally subject to unilateral appropriation by that State. Those resources which are in the high seas, mostly
living resources, are subject to the customary regime of freedom of fishing
by each and all vessels flying the flag of any of the recognized States'
members of the international community. Those which are in the exclusive
economic zone or in the continental shelf of a State are subject to the
"sovereign rights" of that State, but taking into account that in the case
of highly migratory species, such as tuna, their exploitation shall be
carried out in cooperation with the competent regional international organizations. Finally, those resources in the international seabed area belong to mankind as part of its common heritage, and can only be exploited
through the international regime and mechanism which was agreed on at
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and which
appears in the text of the 1982 Montego Bay United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea. 7 In all such cases, however, cooperation between
the owners is essential to protect reciprocal rights and ensure the fulfillment of mutual duties.
One can appreciate that the above conceptualization of "transboundary
resources" completely does away with the idea of "shared" resources,
as the latter concept dilutes the idea of separate property. There is no
legal basis in international law for "shared" property of resources, to the
detriment of State sovereignty.
Barberis himself agrees that the idea of establishing a general legal
regime for shared natural resources is still a doctrinary concept, which
has only recently received international attention through the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held at Stockholm in 1972.18
The first time the concept was used was in General Assembly Resolution
3129 of 1973,19 which had as its precedent the Declaration approved by
the Fourth Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries of the same year.
Resolution 3129 speaks of "common natural resources," but its title refers
to "shared natural resources." Even the idea of common natural resources
is unacceptable, as it lends itself to the notion of joint property, which
is incorrect. What it does attempt to portray is the idea of joint responsibility. Here again, for a country like Mexico it is the latter meaning
which can best describe the nature of such wealth in border areas. How17. Id.
18. See J. BARBERIS, supra note 15, at 143.
19. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Cooperation in the Field of the Environment Concerning Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3129 (XXVIII) (1974),
reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 232 (1974).
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ever, this preferential interpretation does not foreclose the possibility that
any State that wishes to do so may exercise its sovereignty and contractual
liberty to agree to a regime for its transboundary resources which, in the
end, will derive into formulas of shared or joint property.
Albeit scattered, there are precedents of such regimes in international
practice, even if they have not generated widely accepted practices among
the rest of the international community. Even when the general rule is
that the agreed boundary between two States is also valid in the subsoil,
in a vertical fashion, there have been cases in which one party has allowed
the other to undertake mining under the surface of its territory. This is
only a practical modification of the boundary, which does not involve
modification of sovereignty. The oldest case on point involved the salines
of Salzburg, which in 1696 the Duke of Bavaria donated in part to the
Bishop of Salzburg. Also, through the 1816 Aquisgran Treaty the Netherlands ceded to Prussia a part of the coal mines in the subsoil under
Dutch territory adjacent to the border. Later, through a 1952 treaty, an
"exploitation boundary," different from the political one, gave the Netherlands jurisdiction over the subsoil in two zones under the surface of
the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. Article 3 of this treaty
even established that the two zones should be ruled by domestic Dutch
law. Further, in 1950 Belgium and the Netherlands agreed to a boundary
for the exploitation of mines along the Mosa River. The treaty established
that the jurisdiction over the subsoil belonged to the State to whose surface
the coal was taken, and not to the superjacent State. 21 It is not difficult
to assert, with complete assurance, that none of these schemes would be
entertained by Mexico to deal with any of its transboundary resources,
either on its borders with Guatemala, Belize, or the United States.
Given the legislative history and, above all, the national experience
that has fed the legislation in Mexico regulating natural resources, one
would expect that any approaches based on the concept of "shared natural
resources" will be resisted and even repudiated, and not only in the official
world. The process of establishing permanent sovereignty over all oil
resources, which were placed in foreign hands during the dictatorship of
Porfirio Diaz, was the object of a first attempt in the 1917 Constitution,
the foremost byproduct of the Revolution. A sorry relapse to foreign
control occurred as a result of the ill-framed Bucareli Treaties of 1923.
But Mexican sovereignty over its oil resources was finally accomplished
through the 1938 oil expropriation, which constitutes one of the greatest
chapters in the nation's recent history. It was the result of a truly national
20. For a discussion of these and related instruments, see generally Barberis, Los Recursos
Minerales Compartidos entre Estados y el Derecho Internacional, in 8 DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACION
45 (1975).
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struggle, one which can be branded as one of the most popular achievements of the country. The experience was painful for Mexican society as
a whole and, as it derived from the ambition and activities of foreign
corporations, with the backing of their governments, the oil chapter is
and will remain a national experience tainted with a substantial amount
of understandable nationalistic feeling, one which has unavoidably been
transplanted to other natural resources and the need for their defense visa-vis foreign interests.
Mexico has also learned quite important lessons in the field of fisheries,
as the progressive assertion of the rights of the nation over different species
and in ever increasing areas of national maritime jurisdiction has always
been contemplated as a struggle to force foreign fishing vessels out of
such areas so that the country can exploit them exclusively. MexicanU.S. relations have been affected historically by incidents and controversies regarding the fisheries regime along the coasts of Mexico. The
latest chapter of this continued struggle has been the so-called "tuna
war," which since 1978 has remained as a painful controversy between
the two countries. Also, Mexico's central role in the three United Nations
Conferences on the Law of the Sea, in 1958, 1960, and from 1973 to
1982, especially the latter, are definitely part of the untiring Mexican
diplomatic effort, at all possible fora, to assert its permanent sovereignty
over its national resources and to ensure a fair share of the world's wealth.
In negotiating about the use and conservation of transboundary resources with Mexico, the United States will obviously have to take into
account the fact that it will be dealing with a country with a substantially
different economic system. Although Mexico still has a market economy
in general terms, that economy is one in which the State increasingly
participates along with the private sector, thus leading to a so-called
"mixed economy." State participation in the Mexican economy is heavily
concentrated precisely in the exploitation of natural resources which,
according to Article 27 of the Constitution, belong to the nation as a
whole and are, therefore, under the "public domain" regime. Thus, even
more important than economic differences are the legal ones. Additionally,
the historical experience of the country has led it to constitutionally
establish protective national zones precisely in the areas where transboundary resources are located, along its borders, where foreign private
property is excluded. Consequently, in dealing with transboundary resources on its southern border, the United States will have to negotiate
with a single actor, namely, the nation as represented by the federal
government.
The differences in the legal systems of the two countries cannot be
underestimated, for they will play a pivotal role in the question of transboundary resources. As Professor Utton has pointed out, under the com-
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mon law each owner's right to water itself, or the use of water, is insecure'
because other pumpers may take possession of the mobile resource at
any time. Thus, the individual surface owner is encouraged to exploit the
groundwater resource as quickly as possible, so that the fluid and mobile
water resource will not be captured by others. The resource then belongs
to whoever gains possession of it, and conservation measures are risky
because others may capture the resource in the meantime. In contrast,
Mexico has legal authority to control groundwater withdrawals. The government can regulate extraction and establish prohibited zones if existing
developments or the aquifer are in danger of being adversely affected,
or if it is otherwise in the public interest. 2
For all of the above reasons, it will be extremely important to be aware
of Mexico's attitudes toward transboundary resources, which will be
directly informed by its domestic legal provisions and reflected in its
international law practice on the matter. In both spheres, internal22 and
external, Mexico's legal concept of property will be a leading factor.
According to Professor Ricardo Mendez Silva,23 Point Four of the
historical United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources,24 which has become a leading flag
of the developing countries in their struggle for a new international economic order, was the result of a Mexican proposal. That point established
that the exploitation of natural resources of each country shall be carried
out in accordance with its national laws and regulations. This provision
was later reiterated in General Assembly Resolutions 215825 and 2692,26
of November 25, 1966 and December 11, 1970 respectively. All of those
resolutions originated with Resolution 626 of December 21, 1952,27 on
the right to freely exploit natural resources and wealth, and Mexico was
a leading promoter of their adoption. Since then, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources has become a cardinal element
21. See generally Utton, InternationalGroundwaterManagement: The Case of the U.S.-Mexican
Frontier,57 NEB. L. REv. 633 (1978).
22. As stated, the concept of property in Mexican constitutional law is the result of national
historical experiences, and has been greatly influenced by the legal tradition of the country, a tradition
which differs from the one underlying the U.S. legal system. See generally Novoa Monreal, La
Evoluci6n del Derecho de Propiedad ante los Actuales Textos ConstitucionalesLatinoamericanos,
in I EsTuDlos DE DERECHo ECoNOMico 41 (1977).
23. See generally M~ndez Silva, La Soberanta de los Pueblos sobre sus Recursos Naturales, 1617 BOLETfN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 17 (1973).
24. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources of
Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3016 (XXVII) (1973), reprintedin 12 I.L.M. 226 (1973).
25. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2158 (XXI) (1966), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 147 (1967).
26. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources and
Expansion of Domestic Sources of Accumulation for Economic Development, U.N. Doc. AIRES/
2692 (XXV) (1971).
27. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the Right to Freely Exploit Natural Wealth and Resources, GAOR Supp. (No. 20), U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1953).
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of Mexican foreign policy. It is thus not surprising that the principle has
also become central in the conception of the new international economic
order, of which Mexico has been a principal protagonist. The principle
has since been incorporated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, initially proposed by President
Luis Echeverria, and adopted through General Assembly Resolution 3281
on December 12, 1974.2" The same principle has been incorporated in
fundamental multilateral instruments such as the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,29 and in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 ° both in force since 1976, having
been adopted through General Assembly Resolution 2200 of December
16, 1966,"' and in force for Mexico but not yet for the United States.
There is no doubt as to the strong official devotion in Mexico to the
concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources, and this will
play an important role in negotiations on transboundary resources with
any country.32 On the other hand, the International Law Commission, the
subsidiary organ of the United Nations General Assembly entrusted with
the codification and progressive development of international law, has
been working on a scheme for a draft convention to deal with international
watercourses as "shared natural resources" in order to rule their nonnavigational uses.
The progressive work of the commission has been the subject of deliberation by States through the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.
There, the concept of a "system of international watercourse," over which
two or more States exercise sovereignty, 33 has prevailed over the concept
of an "international hydrographical basin" embraced in Articles I and II
of the Helsinki Rules,34 approved by the International Law Association
in 1966. In the view of the States participating in the debates at the Sixth
Committee, the latter concept has a doctrinal element which may overlook
the special characteristics and circumstances of individual cases, and it
28. U.N. General Assembly Resolution, the Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX) (1975).
29. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, U.N.G.A.
Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. AJ6316 (1967), reprinted in 6
1.L.M. 360 (1967).
30. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, U.N.G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1976), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368

(1967).
31. U.N. General Assembly Resolution, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200 (XXI) (1967).

32. See generally LA

SOBERANiA DE LOS ESTADOS SOIRE sus RECURSOS NATURALES.

(A. G6mez

Robledo ed. 1980).
33. For a discussion of the concept of a "system of international watercourse," see generally
Hayton, Progress in Co-operativeArrangements, in EXPERIENCES INTHE 'DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RIVER AND LAKE BASINS 65, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/120 (1983).
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also focuses too much on the surrounding territory of the basin. The
"system" concept has been thus regarded as being more global, which
lends itself to include not only rivers, lakes, and their affluents, but also
other components such as channels, streams, and aquifers, including
groundwater.
The draft articles which the International Law Commission has so far
produced are designed to provide for the management and conservation
of such non-navigational systems, as well as for "system agreements" to
be concluded among the system States in order to implement the general
rules of the convention. Those rules establish the nature of such systems
as "shared natural resources," as well as the principle that there is a duty
to utilize them equitably and reasonably. They prohibit unilateral activities
which may cause harm to other States in the system, and address other
matters as well. 35
Given its legal system and experience, there is little doubt that Mexico
will tend to view more favorably the above concept of "shared natural
resources," given the fact that it is so closely linked with the principle
of sovereignty. Nonetheless, Mexico will probably try to influence a
change in the terminology employed to describe such resources. Already
in that direction are the comments made by the Mexican representative
to the Sixth Committee in 1970.
On December 14, 1979, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted its Resolution 34/99 on the development and strengthening of
good neighborliness between States,36 an item which had been initiated
by a group of States under the leadership of the Romanian Delegation.
This resolution was followed by others in which it was envisaged that
the concept of good neighborliness should be developed in a "proper
international document." ' 37 In its 38th Session the General Assembly
transferred the item to the agenda of its Legal Committee (the Sixth).
The Legal Committee took up that matter and proposed that the General
Assembly adopt its Resolution 38/126 of December 1983,38 which calls
upon all States to define the appropriate framework to develop the concept
in the aforesaid international document. The framework should take into
account, among other proposals, the working paper submitted by the
34. See Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of InternationalRivers, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE

484 (1966).

35. See Evensen (Special Raporteur), PrimerInforme sobre el Derecho de los Usos de los Cursos
deAguas Internacionalespara FinesDistintos de la Navegaci6n, Comisi6n de Derecho Intemacional,
Naciones Unidas, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/367.
36. U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Development and Strengthening of Good Neighborliness Between States, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/99 (1980).
37. Later resolutions included G.A. Res. 36/101, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/101 (1982), and G.A.
Res. 37/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/117 (1982).
38. G.A. Res. 38/126, U.N. Doc. A/38/659 (1983).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

Romanian Delegation on September 22, 1983, 39 which incorporated the
observations made during the past three years by various member States
in response to the above mentioned resolutions.
On July 7, 1982 the United States sent to the U.N. Secretary General
its observations on the topic, in response to General Assembly Resolution
36/101.40 The United States asserted that it maintained excellent relations
with its neighbors, especially Mexico and Canada, and emphasized that
no troops were stationed along their respective borders. However, the
United States did not elaborate on the possible contents of substance that
could be given to the concept of good neighborliness. On the other hand,
the observations of Mexico did advance the concept of economic, scientific, and technological cooperation as essential steps toward good
neighborliness.
More importantly, the Romanian working paper embodies more concrete concepts, based on the general idea of cooperation, such as economic
cooperation at the border zone on the basis of equality of rights, equity,
and mutual benefit in the exploitation of "common resources." It goes
further to call on neighboring States to cooperate on maritime problems
inherent to neighborliness, such as the delimitation of maritime zones,
and common exploration and exploitation of resources which constitute
a physical unity, when common actions prove to be more advantageous
than individual ones. The working paper elaborates on matters pertaining
to the protection of the environment in the border area.
As one may appreciate, the debates in the Legal Committee of the
General Assembly, which have now been oriented toward the regulation
of the utilization of transboundary resources as part of the idea of good
neighborliness, will constitute in the future an appropriate forum where
both Mexico and the United States will have an opportunity to contribute
to the development of legal bases in the field of transboundary resources.
The above description of Mexico's standing on the matter at the international level does indicate that its policy regarding transboundary resources will be the result of a balancing exercise between two concepts:
permanent sovereignty over natural resources versus shared natural resources. Such a policy will probably conceive of those resources as
"transboundary" instead of as "shared," with all the implications that
such precision will have on the country's conception of property and of
sovereignty.
However, a note of warning must be given here. The foreseeable
attachment of Mexico to its concept of sovereignty should not be mistakenly linked with any theory of "absolute sovereignty." Mexico's record
39. U.N. Doc. A/38/440.
40. G.A. Res. 36/101, supra note 39.
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in dealing with the conventional transboundary resources at its border
with the United States shows that its concept of sovereignty is flexibly
"relative." Notwithstanding its most stringent nationalistic or xenophobic
tendencies, derived from historical experience, Mexico has recognized
the need to accept, undertake, and even propose initiatives for joint action
and cooperation with the United States, when they have been needed to
rationally utilize or conserve a given resource. After all, as Professor
Cesar Sepulveda has clearly pointed out, Mexico and the United States
can be given the deserved credit for having contributed, with their practice, to the development of international fluvial law."1 The two countries
together were smart enough to pass beyond the obstacle represented by
the built in intolerance of the so-called Harmon Doctrine,42 and to develop
a bilateral practice of cooperation. This cooperation has been coupled
with the necessary institutionalized mechanism of the International Boundary
and Water Commission, which has not only served as a model for other
countries, but has also set important precedents for the development of
international practice in the field.
Mexican-U.S. experience in the field has contributed to some of the
guiding international principles ruling the use and conservation of transboundary resources, namely: the duty of each country at either side of
the border, when exploiting its part of the resource, conceived as a natural
unity, to refrain from producing a sensible harm; the principle of equitable
and rational utilization; and the duty to undertake previous consultations
and to exchange information. Barberis points out that such principles
constitute the elements of a "law of neighborhood." 4 3
From this author's point of view, Mexico is even prepared to contribute
further to the development of such principles in order to dissipate any
doubt as to the fact that they have already escaped being a mere proposition de legeferenda. It was precisely Mexico which proposed, at the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the formula
which appears in Article 300 of the Montego Bay Convention, and which
reads: "States Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed
under this Convention and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right. "" Both concepts, good faith and abuse of rights,
should be directly incorporated in the legal regime of transboundary
resources. If Mexico were prepared to invoke them regarding the law of
41. See C. SEPULVEDA, supra note 10.
42. For a discussion of the Harmon Doctrine, see Simsarian, The Diversion of Waters Affecting
the United States and Mexico, 17 TEx. L. REV. 27, 59 (1938).
43. J. BARBERIS, supra note'15, at 149, citing Andrassy, Les Relationes Internationales de
Voisinage, in 2 REcumELDESCouRs (1951).

44. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 17, art. 300.
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the sea, there is every reason to believe that it will uphold them when
dealing with its transboundary resources, for its own obvious benefit, as
well as that of its neighbors. If such concepts were to guide the bilateral
practice in the field between Mexico and the United States, they would
certainly provide the regime of transboundary resources with its final
legal foundation.
CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES:
THE NEED FOR AN "INVENTORY"
A classification of transboundary resources must be undertaken on the
basis of the four compartments which could constitute the natural environment of a given border region, namely: those resources which are
found in dry continental or insular territory or land, surface or underground; continental or insular water bodies, surface or underground; marine areas, including the water column, the soil, and the subsoil; and the
atmospheric space. A further compartment could be added if we take into
account the modern use of the cosmic, ultraterrestrial or outer space
regions, which sophisticated technology has turned into a resource. Through
sattelites outer space can be utilized for communication signals which,
when they reach the earth's surface, do not discriminate regarding artificially created State borders. In a few words, we are dealing with the
whole spectrum of the human environment in a specific border region.
Barberis, once again, has produced one of the most comprehensive,
albeit not entirely complete, classifications of transboundary or, as he
calls them, shared resources: international rivers; hydrocarbon deposits;
migratory animals; animals whose habitat includes the territory of more
than one State; and the atmosphere.45 However, other transboundary resources must be taken into consideration. This author proposes the following classifications:
(a) Land resources: (1) Minerals, including: mines; hydrocarbon deposits; and geothermal deposits. (2) Flora, including: naturally protected
areas, such as wetlands, forests, and recreational parks. (3) Fauna, including: migratory animals, and animals in a transboundary habitat.
(b) Continental or insular water deposits: international rivers, streams,
and affluents; international lakes, dams, and reservoirs; freshwater fisheries and other fauna in international rivers, lakes, dams, and reservoirs;
algae and other flora in international lakes, dams, and reservoirs; minerals
carried by or dissolved in the waters of international rivers; and groundwater.
(c) Marine resources: marine water; marine currents; marine winds;
marine tides and waves; ocean thermal energy; minerals dissolved in
45. J. BARBERIS, supra note 15, at 11.
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marine waters; marine living stocks and associated species; anadromous
stocks; catadromous species; sedentary species; highly migratory species;
submarine hydrocarbon deposits; submarine mineral deposits in the soil
and in the subsoil; and submarine geothermal deposits.
(d) Atmospheric resources: air; winds; and the ozone layer.
(e) Outer space resources: communication signals, and solar radiation.
It should be understood that this attempt at a more complete, although
surely not yet exhaustive, classification is based on the following fundamental criteria: that all resources included in each of the items on the
list should be allocated in a transboundary fashion or area, and that the
boundary in question may be separated into either a sovereign State's
territory or areas under its national jurisdiction, or into areas beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction, such as the high seas or the international
seabed area.
What is important for the purposes of this article is that virtually all
categories included in the classification could be physically present in a
transboundary fashion, at the border, land or maritime, between Mexico
and the United States. The most visible exception could perhaps be international natural lakes and their resources, which are absent at that
border. Otherwise, there would be no natural impediment for the possible
presence of all other resources on the list along the 2,000 mile land
border, and along the more than 600 nautical mile maritime border already
agreed on between the two countries. It is an entirely different, albeit
relevant, matter whether or not the existence of each of the resources on
the list has been positively identified at the Mexico-U.S. border area.
This article will attempt to indicate some of those resources in order to
expand the scope of identification, which has so far been limited to
conventional water resources and pollution. Limited attempts at such
expansion have been made, for instance, by Antonio Gonzalez de Leon,
who refers to: energy resources, including hydrocarbons in the eastern
portion of the border, and geothermal deposits in the western side, among
which the Cerro Prieto project deserves mention; land based and submarine minerals; and the living resources of the sea.4 Ernesto Jauregui
adds to the list solar radiation (during a typical summer month the area
receives an average of 550 langleys a day), and other energy resources
derived from winds. 7 There is some Mexican international practice in
the case of some of those other resources, even at the bilateral level with
46. See generallyGonzflez de Le6n, Factores de Tensidn Internacionalen laFronteracon Estados
Unidos, in LA FRONTERA DEL NORTE 7 (G. Salazar Roque ed., 1981). See also Lagoni, Oil and Gas
DepositsAcross National Frontiers, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 215 (1979), and Onorato, Apportionment
of an InternationalCommon Petroleum Deposit, 17 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 84 (1968).
47. See generally Juregui, Recursos Naturalesy MedioAmbiente en laFronteraNorte de Mixico,
in EsTuDios FRONTERizOS 51 (1981).
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the United States. Regarding others, there are only initial indications as
to their presence at the border.
According to Christopher Henry and Robert Morton, there are geothermal resources in the Mexican-Texas border region, including convective systems, some of which have sufficient heat to produce electricity,
and which could be used for industrial or home heating.48 Those systems
favor the development of thermal energy and the production of unconventional gas. Juan Eibenschutz points out that in the western portion of
the border there are significant geothermal resources, which may produce
not only electricity, but also potassium chloride. Aside from Cerro Prieto,
which has an operating capacity of 180 megawatts, two more plants with
a capacity of 220 megawatts each were being built for operation in 1983
and 1984 respectively. Eibenschutz reports that there has already been
some exchange of technical information across the border about this
wealth, and that agreements have been signed with the San Diego Gas
and Electric Company and with South California Edison for the export
of a total capacity of 275 megawatts."
The Mexican government's Secretaria de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia
has designated several regions at the northern border as part of a special
system of naturally protected areas. Both the United States and Mexico
are parties to the Panamerican Union's Convention on Nature Protection
and Wildlife Preservation, adopted in Washington on October 12, 1940.50
This convention regulates the establishment of the concepts of national
parks, national reserves, national monuments, and migratory species.
Only the latter are conceived of as specifically transboundary resources.
The parties agree to adopt all legislation and necessary measures to protect
and to provide for the conservation of the above natural resources, especially migratory species. Although the convention does not deal concretely with the adoption of joint or bilateral measures, whenever those
resources are located in border areas, it might be construed as facilitating
those measures.
Neither Mexico nor the United States is a party to the Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance Specially as Waterfowl Habitat,
adopted in Ramsar on February 2, 197 1.' However, Mexico has identified
such wetlands, some of which are located in the border area, at Tamaulipas, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Baja California Norte.
48. See generally Henry & Morton, Transboundary Geothermal Resources of Texas and Mexico,
NAT. REs. J. 973 (1982).
49. See generally Eibenschutz, Recursos Geot4rmicos en la Frontera Noroccidental, 22 NAT.
REs. J. 991 (1982).
50. Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, Oct.
12, 1940, 36 Stat. 1354, T.S. No. 981, reprinted in 3 BEVANS 630 (1969); Diario Oficial, May 29,
1942 [hereinafter cited as Convention on Nature Protection].
51. 996 U.N.T.S. 0 (1976).
22
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On February 7, 1936 Mexico and the United States signed the Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, which
entered into force on March 15, 1937.52 This convention was supplemented by an agreement through an exchange of notes in Mexico City
on March 10, 1972, which entered into force the same date.53 The convention refers to those migratory birds which cross the border between
the two countries, and provides some measures for their conservation.
The same measures are extended, by virtue of Article V of the convention,
to game mammals, and they provide for the establishment of closed
seasons and refuge zones, and the issuing of hunting permits. They also
totally prohibit hunting certain species and hunting from airplanes, and
regulate the transportation of some species across the border. All of these
provisions are aimed at the conservation and rational utilization of such
natural resources for purposes of sport, food, commerce, and industry.
The convention includes a list of migratory birds to which it applies,
which was expanded through the 1972 Supplementary Agreement. For
the last fifty-two years the convention has provided for the protection of
sixty-three families of migratory birds, thus constituting an example of
bilateral cooperation to deal with transboundary resources with an ecologically oriented mind.
In October of 1983 the General Committee for the Conservation of
Wildlife, which is formed by representatives of both Mexico and the
United States and which oversees the implementation of the 1936 convention, decided to seek an institutionalization of the committee as a
permanent mechanism.54 The new body would then be dedicated to the
conservation of all species of wildlife and their habitat in the border area,
and would not be restricted to migratory birds and game mammals. The
mechanism would be limited to the preparation of joint projects on the
basis of cooperation for the prudent and rational management of those
resources. It would not be its purpose to provide for joint utilization
activities at either side of the border. The General Committee also follows
the implementation of the 1940 Washington Convention described above,55
which in its turn also has an annex which lists species whose habitats are
in the border area.
It is probably because of the existence of the above bilateral instruments
52. Convention on Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, Feb. 7, 1936, United
States-Mexico, 50 Stat. 1311, T.S. No. 912, reprinted in 9 BEVANS 1017 (1972); Diario Oficial,
May 15, 1937.
53. Protection of Migratory Birds, Mar. 10, 1972, United States-Mexico, 23 U.S.T. 260, T.I.A.S.
No. 7302.
54. The committee is formed by representatives of the United States Federal Wildlife Services
of the Department of the Interior and the Direcci6n General de Flora y Fauna Silvestre of the Mexican
Secretarfa de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologfa.
55. Convention on Nature Protection, supra note 50.
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that neither Mexico nor the United States has signed the 1979 Bonn
Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals .S6
However, were they to become parties to that convention, they would
have a more global juridical basis for bilateral cooperation, on a wider
range of living species.
According to Article 56 of the 1982 Montego Bay Convention on the
Law of the Sea, coastal States have, within their exclusive economic
zones, sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing natural resources. 5 The coastal States also have
sovereign rights as to other activities within the zones, such as the production of energy from the water, currents, and winds. Ocean Thermal
Energy Conversion (OTEC) is a technique about to be developed to exploit
the thermal resources of tropical seas. These resources are found along
the coasts of only three developed countries (the United States, Japan,
and Australia), and of about seventy-three developing countries, including
Mexico. These resources can be developed into electrical energy, and
could thus be important for the progress of many of the concerned States.
In the central part of the Gulf of Mexico, in areas where the line
delimiting the marine areas of national jurisdiction of Mexico and the
United States had been agreed upon through the Exchange of Notes of
November 24, 1976," s and which was included in the still pending 1978
Treaty of Maritime Delimitation between the two countries,5 9 the potential
for OTEC has been identified. Thus, this resource clearly satisfies the
requirements of classification as a transboundary resource. The area's
geography will undoubtedly require mutual support and cooperation, for
technical, economic, and ecological reasons.' ° It should be remembered
that, in Mexico, energy resources and their production fall clearly within
the exclusive realm of the State. This is a fundamental matter for the
United States and its nationals, whether they are physical or juridical
persons, to consider if they decide to initiate OTEC activities in the
maritime border area.
Article 63 of the Law of the Sea Convention deals with stocks of living
resources occurring within the exclusive economic zones of two or more
coastal States, or both within the exclusive econonic zone and an area
beyond and adjacent to it, such as the high seas. 6 For these typical
56. Reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 15 (1980).
57. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 17, art 56.
58. Agreement Concerning Certain Maritime Boundaries, Nov. 24, 1976, United States-Mexico,
29 U.S.T. 196, T.I.A.S. No. 8805.
59. Treaty on Maritime Delimitation, May 4, 1978, S. EXEC. Doc. No. F-H, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4-6.
60. See Departamento de Asuntos Econ6micos y Sociales Internacionales, Guiapara la Conversidn de la Energia Tgrmica del Ocdano (CETO) en Beneficio de los Palses en Desarrollo, U.N.
Doc. ST/ESA/134.
61. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 17, art. 63.
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transboundary resources coastal States have the duty to seek, either directly or through/ appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to
agree upon the measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of such stocks. These stocks have not yet become
evident in the maritime border between Mexico and the United States.
However, Massachusetts Institute of Technology research fellow Patrick
H. Hefferman has indicated that there are a number of fisheries across
the Baja California Norte-California border that have been harvested by
boats from both States and which are ecologically important to them.62
They include the northern anchovy, abalone, and lobster, which are ecologically interdependent fisheries, and which migrate across the border.
Traditionally, the Mexican government has not been open to discussions
with U.S. representatives on the matter. However, recent talks between
fisheries officials from both countries have envisaged joint scientific research regarding those species. If such research should prove that there
is a need for joint conservation measures to protect cross-border fisheries,
the Mexican government would undoubtedly give a further illustration
of its readiness to take action with a full ecologically minded approach.
Article 64 of the Convention deals with highly migratory species,
namely, tuna.63 It provides that the coastal State and other States whose
nationals fish in the region for tuna shall cooperate directly or through
appropriate international organizations, with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such species
throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic
zone. A second paragraph of this article clearly provides that the latter
rules apply in addition to other provisions of the part of the convention
dealing with the exclusive economic zone. This means that such species
are unquestionably subject to the sovereign rights of the coastal States
and are not, in any way, to be regarded as free or even as "shared"
resources. This has been the Mexican position, shared by all coastal States
in the eastern Pacific Ocean, through whose waters tuna migrate. The
United States is not one of those coastal States because tuna in that region,
especially yellow fin tuna, migrate from northern Chile to the Baja California Peninsula. However, the United States has attempted a different
interpretation in order to ensure access by its boats to the resource; it
asserts that tuna do not belong to the coastal State.
The difference has led to a real controversy, labeled the "tuna war,"
which led Mexico to abandon the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, where its sovereign rights could not be guaranteed. As a result,
the United States enacted domestic legislation banning the import of tuna
62. See generally Hefferman, Conflict Over Marine Resources, in MEXICO-UNITED STATES RELAnONS 168 (S. Kaufman Purcell ed. 1981).

63. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 17, art. 64.
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from Mexico. In any case, tuna are not a transboundary resource in the
border between Mexico and the United States, but tuna are a transboundary resource between Mexico and the rest of the international community,
given the fact that they migrate across the boundary between the Mexican
exclusive economic zone and the high seas, where the United States has
freedom of fishing. Unfortunately, the United States has adopted a very
inflexible position, which does not lead in any way to cooperation. When
the United States established an exclusive economic zone in 1983, jurisdiction over highly migratory species was specifically excluded.'
The occurrence of submarine oil and gas deposits in the different regions
of the world, many of which are located in transboundary areas, has been
the subject of initial identification. Such deposits are in practically all
regions of the world's continental shelves, whether in the North Sea, the
Gulf of Alaska, the Canadian Arctic waters, the Atlantic continental margin in North America, the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, Lake
Maracaibo and the Gulf of Venezuela, the South American Atlantic continental shelf, the West African continental margins, the Mediterranean
and Aegean Seas, the Northwest Australian shelf, the continental shelf
areas of the Far East, the South China Sea, the Sunda shelf, the Baltic
Sea, the Barents and Kara Seas, or other areas.65
Most of these areas include the adjacent or opposite continental shelves
of more than one State, which probably accounts for the enormous difficulties encountered at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, and the inability of its participants to come to a consensual
agreement on the articles of the 1982 Convention dealing with the principles for the delimitation of such zones of neighboring jurisdiction. In
real life, the diplomatic difficulties at the conference are only an expression of actual bilateral and, sometimes, subregional controversies among
States which do not contribute to the maintenance of regional peace,
security, and stability. It must be remembered that when the convention's
adoption was put to a vote at the conference on April 30, 1982, two of
the only four States which, among a total of 141, voted against it were
States with continental shelf delimitation controversies with their neighbors, namely, Turkey and Venezuela. Many of those controversies have
been taken to court, giving the International Court of Justice a heavy
workload which, it is hoped, will eventually form the international jurisprudence on the matter, despite the fact that each case has been and
will be tried individually, and with the limited effects established in Article
50 of the Court's statute.66
64. See generally A. SZ9KELY, MIXICO Y EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DEL MAR (1979).
65. See S. BROWN, N. CORNELL, L. FABIAN & E. WEISS, REGIMES FOR THE OCEAN, OUTER
AND WEATHER

SPACE

63-73 (1977).

66. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, reprinted in 3
BEVANS 1179 (1969). See also Charney, Ocean Boundaries Between Nations:A Theoryfor Progress,
78 AM. J. INT'L L. 582 (1984).
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As recently as October 29, 1983 Sweden and Denmark issued a Joint
Communique concerning the delimitation of their continental shelves and
fishing zones. The delimitation is based on the median line, with the
deviations necessary for practical and other reasons. It seems that the
agreement was facilitated by the fact that Danish exploration around the
area of Heleserrne found no existence of hydrocarbon deposits. Continental shelf delimitation negotiations between Venezuela and Colombia
have also been dictated by the potential of hydrocarbon deposits.
The International Court of Justice has dealt with the following cases
on continental shelf delimitations: the North Sea ContinentalShelf Case
(W. Ger. v. Den.);67 the North Sea Continental Shelf Case (W. Ger. v.
Neth.);68 the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.);69 the
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia-Libyan Arab Jamahiriya);7" the Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
in the Gulf of Maine Area (U.S. v. Can.);7 and the Case Concerning the
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta).72
Professor Utton recognizes a similarity in characteristics between oil
and gas on the one hand, and international aquifers on the other, as
"shared" natural resources. He states that, just as it would be unreasonable
to permit a State to deal with the waters of an international stream without
regard to the needs of its co-riparian, it would be likewise unreasonable
for nations that share a common petroleum structure to attempt to exploit
it without cooperating. Thus, he declares that cooperative development
best serves the self interest of the "co-owners" of an oil field by minimizing economic and physical waste that would otherwise result. Such
cooperation requires the administrative structure and the legal framework
for developing a divided petroleum deposit as a unit. Thus, he favors
"unitization," given the migratory feature of oil and gas, which can be
best administered by some sort of bilateral commission, a mechanism
that would work on the basis of consultation and mandatory powers. 7 In
other words, if an International Boundary and Water Commission has
been possible and successful between Mexico and the United States,
Utton's thoughts seem to suggest that a similar mechanism would be
feasible and desirable to exploit transboundary submarine hydrocarbons.
However, so-called "joint operating agreements" for the development
and production of transboundary oil and gas in the marine subsoil may
not prove acceptable to Mexico, as they involve the appointment of an
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
VA. J.

See
Id.
See
See
See
See
See

generally 1969 I.C.J. Nos. 51 & 52, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 340 (1969).

generally 1976 I.C.J. No. 62, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 985 (1976).
generally 1982 I.C.J. No. 63, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 22 (1982).
generally 1984 I.C.J. No. 67, reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1197 (1984).
generally 1985 I.C.J. No. 68, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1189 (1985).
generally Utton, Institutional Arrangements for Developing North Sea Oil and Gas, 9
INT'L L. 66 (1968).
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entity as the "operator," who will manage activities for the common
benefit of the States involved. Naturally, this sort of joint venture would
dilute the nature of PEMEX as Mexico's monopolistic State institution
in the field. Also, these agreements may be viewed negatively in Mexico,
as they are based on a concept of "shared natural resources," which
implies also a concept of shared sovereignty. However, the experience
in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea may open the way for this kind
of scheme, for it also includes the additional complexity of participation
of State entities such as the British Gas Company, BNOC, and Statoil.74
On May 4, 1978 Mexico and the United States signed a Treaty on
Maritime Delimitation,75 which formalized the contents of an Agreement
Concerning Certain Maritime Boundaries, carried out through an exchange of notes in Mexico City on November 24, 1976.76 Despite the
fate of the 1978 treaty, which has been approved by the Mexican Senate
but not by the U.S. Senate, the 1976 agreement remains in force.
As stated, the Mexican Senate approved the 1978 treaty on December
20 of that year,77 and thus Mexico is ready to ratify it. However, when
President Carter sent the treaty to the U.S. Senate for its advice and
consent, an unexpected problem emerged. During Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on June 30, 1980 Princeton Geology Professor
Hollys D. Hedberg advised against ratification of the treaty. He regarded
it as contrary to the interests of the United States, arguing that the line
drawn to measure the Mexican exclusive economic zone was illegal and
gave Mexico an important portion of the central part of the Gulf, where
an enormous potential of mineral and hydrocarbon deposits had been
identified. The delimitation line had been drawn from some islands off
the Yucatan Peninsula in the Gulf of Mexico. Hedberg suggested that the
line should be measured from the continental coast of the Yucatan Peninsula, and that the central portion of the Gulf should be equally divided
by the two countries. 78 In response, U.S. State Department Legal Advisor
Mark B. Feldman asserted that Hedberg was completely wrong, and that
the drawing of lines from islands was an internationally recognized principle which even the United States had used to its benefit in other geographical areas. 79 Because of Hedberg's statement, which was subsequently
74. See P. SWAN, OCEAN OIL AND GAS DRILLING AND THE LAW 66-81 (1979).

75. Treaty on Maritime Delimitation, supra note 63.
76. Agreement Concerning Certain Maritime Boundaries, supra note 62. For a discussion of the
agreement and the treaty, see generally Sz6kely, A Commentary With the Mexican View on the
Problem of Maritime Boundaries in United States-Mexican Relations, 22 NAT. RES. 1. 155 (1982).
See also Schmitt, The Problem of Maritime Boundaries in U.S.-Mexican Relations, 22 NAT. RES.

J. 139
77.
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(1982).
Diario Oficial, Jan. 22, 1979.
See generally Hedberg, Ocean Floor Boundaries, 204 SCIENCE 135 (1979).
CONG. REC. S12737 (Sept. 17, 1980) (statement of Mark B. Feldman).
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supported by other geologists, it took the Foreign Relations Committee
until December 20, 1980 to recommend Senate approval of the treaty.
However, with such precedent, the Senate has abstained from taking
action on this bilateral instrument. Some senators even suggested that the
treaty should be withdrawn from their consideration until such time as
some studies on the matter, undertaken by the United States Geological
Survey, are completed. Unfortunately, the Senate has been clearly misled
by information which is totally erroneous, and provided by a "political
geologist" not knowledgeable on the applicable law. If Mexico had not
had the right to measure its 200 mile exclusive economic zone from the
said islands (Cayo Arenas and Cayo Arcas), and it had to do so from the
continental coast, the portion in the central Gulf which would have been
otherwise inside Mexican jurisdiction would then become a part of the
high seas. Therefore, the proposal for dividing such portion between the
two countries is preposterous, as it would have constituted an illegal
appropriation, on the basis of the most elementary rules of customary
and conventional international law, especially the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas,"0 and the agreement arrived at by consensus at
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,"' which
Mexico has already ratified.8 2
It is obvious that Professor Hedberg's illegitimate and illegal proposal
would make the hydrocarbon and mineral deposits in the central Gulf of
Mexico a transboundary resource between Mexico and the United States.
However, international law supports Mexico's position in the sense that
these resources, which are located in the so-called Sigsbee Knolls, belong
to Mexico. Because the resources are within the subsoil of Mexico's
exclusive economic zone, the nation has sovereign rights over them. In
any case, since they are in a zone adjacent to the international seabed
area, the resources are transboundary between Mexico and mankind's
common heritage.
It may be possible that continued studies could eventually identify the
existence of some other transboundary mineral and hydrocarbon deposits
in the maritime boundary established by the 1978 treaty. In that case it
would be necessary for the two countries to jointly agree on a regime for
their exploitation and conservation.
Several analyses have involved the need to contemplate alternative
regimes, through collective action, for the exploitation of scarce resources
in the world which, for the sake of economic efficiency, should be regarded as an activity to be shared by States at the North-South, East80. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578.
81. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 17.
82. Diario Oficial, Feb. 18 and June 1, 1983.
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West, and South-South levels.8 3 This may be a sound objective for the
distant future, for which the evolving practice of States in dealing with
their transboundary resources will be an important experimental laboratory. So far, developing countries like Mexico have fought for a new
international economic order whose foundation is not necessarily a sound
division of labor among the members of the international community in
the exploitation of the world's natural resources. Instead, they seek a
perfected application of the status quo, but on a more just and equitable
basis, and founded on the concept of permanent State sovereignty over
natural resources.
As Mexico has proved in the past, precisely in dealing with transboundary water resources with the United States, such a concept of sovereignty need not be taken to irrational or absolute extremes. This is
especially true when there is so much room and need for joint cooperation,
for mutual benefit, in good faith, and without abuse of rights.

83. See, e.g., R. ARAD, U. ARAD, R. MACCULLOCH, J. PINERA & A. HOLLICK, SHARING GLOBAL
RESOURCES (1979).

